

# **INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT**

**ASSESSMENT  
OF THE  
REACTION CONTROL  
SYSTEM  
Vol. 2 of 5**

**26 FEBRUARY 1988**



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-742  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 742  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-743  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 743  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3	/3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3	/3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /		]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-744  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 744  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-745  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 745  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-746  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 746  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-747  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 747  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-748  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 748  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-749  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 749  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-750  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 750  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-751  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 751  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-752  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 752  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-753  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 753  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-754  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 754  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-755  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 755  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-756  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 756  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-757  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 757  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-758  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 758  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-759  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 759  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS THE REMOVAL OF "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-760  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 760  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-761  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 761  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3	/3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3	/3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-762  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 762  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-763  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 763  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-764  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 764  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-765  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 765  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-766  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 766  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-767  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 767  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-768  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 768  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-769  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 769  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-770  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 770  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-771  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 771  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-772  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 772  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-773  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 773  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-774  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 774  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-775	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 775  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]    *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-776  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 776  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-777  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 777  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-778  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 778  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-779  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 779  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-780  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 780  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-781  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [     ]  
NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 781  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-782  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 782  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-783	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM:            FRCS  
MDAC ID:              783  
ITEM:                  RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:    (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-784  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 784  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-785  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 785  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-786  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 786  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-787

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 787

ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-788  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 788  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-789

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 789

ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-790  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 790  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-791	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 791  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11095X-11099X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-792  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 792  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-793

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 793

ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN

CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-794  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 794  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-795  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 795  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-796  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 796  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-797	BASELINE	[    ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[    ]

SUBSYSTEM:            FRCS  
MDAC ID:              797  
ITEM:                  MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:    (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-798  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 798  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11095X-11099X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-799  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 799  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11100X-11104X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-800  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 800  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-801	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 801  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-802  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 802  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-803	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 803  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-804  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 804  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-805

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 805

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[     /     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-806

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 806

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE

CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11100X-11104X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-807	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 807  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11100X-11104X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-808  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 808  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-809  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 809  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-810  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 810  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-811	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 811  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
(ADD/DELETE)				

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-812  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 812  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-813

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 813

ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-814  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 814  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-815

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 815

ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[     /     ]		[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]		[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11105X-11109X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-816  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 816  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11105X-11109X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-817	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 817  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-818  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 818  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-819	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 819  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA [    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]		[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-820  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 820  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-821	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 821  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]	[    ]
		(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-822

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 822

ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-823 BASELINE [    ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 823  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-  
 ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11110X-11114X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-824  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 824  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-825	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 825  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11110X-11114X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-826  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 826  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-827	BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 827  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-828  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 828  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-829	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]

SUBSYSTEM:           FRCS  
MDAC ID:             829  
ITEM:                MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:   (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-830  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 830  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-831 BASELINE [   ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 831  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
 CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-832  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 832  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-833	BASELINE	[ ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 833  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[ ]
INADEQUATE	[ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-834  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 834  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-835	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 835  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-836  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 836  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-837

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 837

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-838  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 838  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-839  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 839  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-840  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 840  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO  
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-841  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 841  
ITEM: FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-842  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 842  
ITEM: FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-843  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 843  
ITEM: FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-844  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 844  
ITEM: FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-845	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 845  
ITEM: OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-846  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 846  
ITEM: OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-847  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 847  
ITEM: OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-848  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 848  
ITEM: OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-849  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 849  
 ITEM: FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-850  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 850  
ITEM: FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-851  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 851  
ITEM: FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-852  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 852  
ITEM: FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-853  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 853  
ITEM: L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-854  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 854  
ITEM: L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-855  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 855  
ITEM: OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-856  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 856  
ITEM: OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-857	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1	NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 857	
ITEM: OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR	
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN	

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]		[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-858  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 858  
ITEM: OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-859	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 859  
ITEM: OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
	A	B	C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE [    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-860  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 860  
ITEM: OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-861	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 861  
ITEM: OX TK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-862  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103370 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 862  
ITEM: OX TK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-863  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 863  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-864  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 864  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-865	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 865  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]		[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-866  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 866  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-867	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 867  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-868  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 868  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-869  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 869  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-870  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 870  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-871	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	03-2F-103350 -3	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 871  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-872  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 872  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-873	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 873  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-874  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 874  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88 NASA DATA:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-875 BASELINE [ ]  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 875  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-876  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 876  
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-877  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 877  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-878  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 878  
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-879  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2153 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 879  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-879A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2154 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 879  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-880  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 880  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[ ]
INADEQUATE	[ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-880A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 880  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-881  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 881  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-881A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 881  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-882  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 882  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-882A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 882  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-883  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 883  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-883A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 883  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-884	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]
SUBSYSTEM:	FRCS		
MDAC ID:	884		
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11001X-11079X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-885  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 885  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-886  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 886  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-887  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 887  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-888  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 888  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-889  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 889  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-890  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 890  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-891  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 891  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-892  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 892  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-893  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 893  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-894  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 894  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-895  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 895  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-896  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 896  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-897  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 897  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-898	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 898  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-899  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 899  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-900  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 900  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-901  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 901  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-902  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 902  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-903  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 903  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-904  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 904  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-905  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 905  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-906  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 906  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-907  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 907  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-908  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 908  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-909  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 909  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-910  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 910  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-911  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 911  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-912  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 912  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-913  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 913  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.  
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-914  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 914  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-915  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 915  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-916  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 916  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-917  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 917  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-918  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 918  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-919  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 919  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-920  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 920  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-921  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 921  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-922  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 922  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-923  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 923  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-924  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 924  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-925  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 925  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-926  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 926  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-927  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 927  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-928  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 928  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-929  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 929  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-930  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 930  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-931  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 931  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-932  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 932  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-933  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 933  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-934  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 934  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-935  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 935  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-936  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 936  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-937  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 937  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-938  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 938  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-939  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 939  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-940  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 940  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-941  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 941  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
-----------	-------	-------	-------	-----------------------

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND 5. REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS  
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL  
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-942  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 942  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-943  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 943  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-944  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 944  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-945  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 945  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-946  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 946  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-947  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 947  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-948  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 948  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-949  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 949  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-950  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 950  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-951  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 951  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-952  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 952  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-953  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 953  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-954  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 954  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-955  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 955  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-956  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: . FRCS  
MDAC ID: 956  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-957  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 957  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-958  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 958  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-959  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 959  
ITEM: FUSE, 2A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-960  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 960  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-961  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 961  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-962  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 962  
ITEM: FUSE, 2A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-963  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 963  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-964  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 964  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-965  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 965  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-966  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 966  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-967  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 967  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-968  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 968  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-969  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 969  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-970  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 970  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-971  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 971  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-972  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 972  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD  
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-973  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 973  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-974  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 974  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS OF MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-975  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 975  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-976  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 976  
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-977  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 977  
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-978  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 978  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT			A	B	C	
	HDW/FUNC						
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-979  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 979  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-980  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 980  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-981  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 981  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-982  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 982  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-983  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 983  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-984  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 984  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-985  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 985  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-986  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 986  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-987  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 987  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-988  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 988  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-989  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 989  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-990  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 990  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-991  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 991  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-992  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 992  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-993  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 993  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-994  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 994  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-995  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 995  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-996  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 996  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-997  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 997  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-998  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 998  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-999  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 999  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1000  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1000  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1001  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1001  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1002  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1002  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1003  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1003  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1004  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1004  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1005  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1005  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1006  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1006  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1007  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1007  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT			A	B	C	
	HDW/FUNC						
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1008  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1008  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1009  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1009  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1010  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1010  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1011  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1011  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1012  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1012  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1013  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1013  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1014  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1014  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1015  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1015  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1016  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1016  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1017  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1017  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1018  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1018  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1019  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1019  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1020  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1020  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1021  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1021  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1022  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1022  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1023  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1023  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1024  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1024  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1025  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1025  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1026  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1026  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1027  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1027  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1028  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1028  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1029  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1029  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1030  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1030  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1031  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1031  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1032  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1032  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1033  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1033  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1034  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2111 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1034  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1035  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1035  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

RLR42 TYPE RESISTORS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO RWR80 TYPE RESISTORS WHICH CAN SHORT. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.  
NOTE: OPEN FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR ON THE 05-6KF-2111-1 FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING. SHORT FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR TO BE CREATED.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1036  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1036  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT		A	B	C	
HDW/FUNC					
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1037  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1037  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1038  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1038  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1039  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1039  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1040  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1040  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1041  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1041  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1042  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1042  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1043  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1043  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1044  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1044  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1045  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1045  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1046  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1046  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1047  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1047  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1048  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1048  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1049  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1049  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1050  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1050  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1051  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1051  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1052  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1052  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1053  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1053  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1054  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1054  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1055  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1055  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1056  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1056  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1057  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1057  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1058	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1058  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1059  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1059  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1060  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1060  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1061  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1061  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1062

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1062

ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[     /     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]
COMPARE	[ N /N     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1063  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1063  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1064 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1064  
 ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,  
 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-1065	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]
SUBSYSTEM:	FRCS		
MDAC ID:	1065		
ITEM:	RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1066  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1066  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11120X-11124X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1067  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1067  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11120X-11124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1068	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1068  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1069  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1069  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1070  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1070  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1071  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1071  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1072 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1072  
 ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,  
 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1073

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

FRCS

MDAC ID:

1073

ITEM:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,

4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11115X-11119X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1074  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1074  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1075  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1075  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1076

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1076

ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1077  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1077  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1078  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1078  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1079  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1079  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1080  
 NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1080  
 ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,  
 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1081  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1081  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,  
6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1082

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1082

ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1083  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1083  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11130X-11134X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1084  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1084  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1085  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1085  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1086 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1086  
 ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1087  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1087  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1088  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1088  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1089  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1089  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11125X-11129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1090	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1090  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA [    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]		[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11140X-11144X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1091  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1091  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1092

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1092

ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]

INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1093  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1093  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,  
2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1094 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1094  
 ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1095

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1095

ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]

INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1096  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1096  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,  
6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1097  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1097  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,  
6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1098 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1098  
 ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11140X-11144X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1099  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1099  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,  
8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11140X-11144X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1100  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1100  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1101  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1101  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1102  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1102  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1103  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1103  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1104 BASELINE [    ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1104  
 ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,  
 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1105  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1105  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,  
4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11135X-11139X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1106  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1106  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1107  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1107  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-1108	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]
SUBSYSTEM:	FRCS		
MDAC ID:	1108		
ITEM:	RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1, 2		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1109  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1109  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS  
1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1110	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1110	
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
		A            B            C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]	[    ]    *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1111  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1111  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1112

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1112

ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS  
5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1113  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1113  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS  
5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1114

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1114

ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS  
7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[     /     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[     ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[     ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]

INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11150X-11154X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1115  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [     ]  
NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1115  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS  
7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11150X-11154X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1116	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1116  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
	A	B	C
NASA [    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDs FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1117  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1117  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDS FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1118  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1118  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS  
1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDS FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1119  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1119  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS  
1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDS FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1120  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [     ]  
NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1120  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDS FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1121  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1121  
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT  
IDS FRCS 11145X-11149X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1122	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1122  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11155X-11159X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1123  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1123  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1124

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1124

ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1125  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1125  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH  
CONTACTS 1, 2 OR 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1126

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1126

ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1127  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1127  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1128 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1128  
 ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH  
 CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
 ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1129  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1129  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1130	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1130	
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH	
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1131  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1131  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH  
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11155X-11159X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1132	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: NONE	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1132  
ITEM: RJDF1B MANIFOLD F1 TRICKLE TEST

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS. ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1133  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1133  
ITEM: RJDF1A MANIFOLD F2 TRICKLE TEST

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO  
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.  
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C  
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1134  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1134  
ITEM: RJDF2A MANIFOLD F3 TRICKLE TEST

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO  
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.  
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C  
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1135  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1135  
ITEM: RJDF2B MANIFOLD F4, F5 TRICKLE TEST

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO  
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.  
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C  
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1136  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1136  
 ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1D,  
 F3D, F2D, F4D

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1137  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1137  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1D,  
F3D, F2D, F4D

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1138  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1138  
 ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1F,  
 F2F, F3F

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1139  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1139  
 ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1F,  
 F2F, F3F

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1140  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1140  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1L,  
F3L, F2R, F4R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1141  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1141  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1L,  
F3L, F2R, F4R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1142	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2	NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1142	
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1U, F2U, F3U	
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN	

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1143  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1143  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1U,  
F2U, F3U

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1144  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1144  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE: PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-2 FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1145  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1145  
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE: PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-1 FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1146	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2	NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1146	
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1D, F2D, F3D, F4D	
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN	

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1147  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1147  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1D,  
F2D, F3D, F4D

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1148  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1148  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1F, F2F, F3F

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

		CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
			A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]	*
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1149  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1149  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1F,  
F2F, F3F

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1150  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1150  
 ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1L, F3L, F2R, F4R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1151  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1151  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1L,  
F3L, F2R, F4R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1152  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1152  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1U, F2U, F3U

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1153  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1153  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F1U,  
F2U, F3U

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1154  
 NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1154  
 ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE: PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-2 FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1155  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1155  
ITEM: OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,  
F5R

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:  
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-1 FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE  
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE  
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1156  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1156  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1157  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1157  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1158  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1158  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1159  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1159  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
 DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1160  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1160  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1161  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1161  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1162  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1162  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1163  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1163  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1164  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1164  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1165  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1165  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1166  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1166  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1167  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1167  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1168  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1168  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1169  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1169  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
 DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1170  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1170  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1171  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1171  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1172  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1172  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[3168H]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1173  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1173  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1174  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1174  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1175  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1175  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1176  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1176  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1177  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1177  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
 DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPAE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1178  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1178  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1179  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1179  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES  
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1180  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1180  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1181  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1181  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1182  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1182  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1183  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1183  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1184  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1184  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1185  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1185  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1186  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1186  
 ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1187  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1187  
ITEM: FUSE, 20A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1188  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1188  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3 AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1189  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1189  
 ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3  
 AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1190  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1190  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3 AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1191  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1191  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3  
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1192  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1192  
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1193  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1193  
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1194  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1194  
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1195  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1195  
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS  
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1196  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2010 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1196  
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS  
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1197  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1197  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 3

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1198  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1198  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 3

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1199  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1199  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 1

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1200  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1200  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 1

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1201  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1201  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX FWD HTR PNL 4

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1202  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1202  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX FWD HTR PNL 4

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1203  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1203  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 2

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1204	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1204  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 2

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1205  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1205  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1206  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1206  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1207  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1207  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1208	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1208  
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1209  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1209  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1210	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1210  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1211  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1211  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1212	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1212  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1213  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1213  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1214	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1214  
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1215  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1215  
ITEM: HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1216  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1216  
ITEM: HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1217  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1217  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1218  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1218  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1219  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1219  
 ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1220  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1220  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1221  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1221  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1222  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1222  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1223  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1223  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1224  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1224  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1225  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1225  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1226  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1226  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1227  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1227  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER  
SIDE OF RESISTOR.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1228  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1228  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER  
SIDE OF RESISTOR.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1229  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1229  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER  
SIDE OF RESISTOR.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1230  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1230  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER SIDE OF RESISTOR.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1231  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1231  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1232  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1232  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1233  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1233  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1234  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1234  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1235  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1235  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1236  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1236  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1237  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1237  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1238  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1238  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT			A	B	C	
	HDW/FUNC						
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	* [    ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1239  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1239  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1240  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1240  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1241  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1241  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1242  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1242  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1243  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1243  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1244  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1244  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1245  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1245  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1246  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1246  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT			A	B	C	
	HDW/FUNC						
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1247  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1247  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH S3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11185X-11189X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1248  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1248  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH S3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS FRCS 11185X-11189X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1249  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1249  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH S3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11185X-11189X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-1250	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]

SUBSYSTEM:           FRCS  
MDAC ID:             1250  
ITEM:                 MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:   (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11160X-11164X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1251  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1251  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1252  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1252  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1253  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1253  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1254

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1254

ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1255  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1255  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1256  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1256  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
/N COMPARE	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1257  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1257  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11160X-11164X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1258 BASELINE [ ]  
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1258  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11165X-11169X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1259

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1259

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1260	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1260  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1261  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1261  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1262

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1262

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1263

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1263

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1264	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1264	
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
		A            B            C	
NASA [    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1265

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1265

ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11165X-11169X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1266  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1266  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11170X-11174X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1267  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1267  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1268	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1268  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1269  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1269  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1270	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1270	
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF	
CONTACTS 3, 4	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1271  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1271  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1272  
 NASA FMEA #:  
 NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [    ]  
 SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1272  
 ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
 IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1273  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1273  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11170X-11174X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1274  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [     ]  
NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1274  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[     /     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ]	[     ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[     ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[     ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11175X-11179X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1275  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1275  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1276	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1276  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1277  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1277  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1278	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1278	
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF	
CONTACTS 3, 4	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]    *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1279  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1279  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1280 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1280  
 ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
 IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1281  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1281  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11175X-11179X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1282  
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1282  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
 IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11180X-11184X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1283  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1283  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1284  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1284  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1285  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1285  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1286

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS

MDAC ID: 1286

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1287  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1287  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1288	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS	
MDAC ID: 1288	
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1289  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1289  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY  
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS 11180X-11184X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1290  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1290  
ITEM: FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1291  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1291  
ITEM: FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1292  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1292  
 ITEM: OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1293  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1293  
ITEM: OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1294	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121345 -1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1294  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1295  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1295  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1296	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1296  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1297  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 1297  
 ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1298  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1298  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1299  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1299  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1300	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1300  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. NOTE:  
VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON  
THIS FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1301  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 1301  
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE VERNIER THERMAL SWITCH WAS PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND DID NOT REQUIRE A SEPARATE FMEA. FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRIMARY THRUSTERS, IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE CREATED TO COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11001X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2006-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11001  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL  
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11002X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2006-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11002  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL  
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11003X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11003  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ NA ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.  
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11004X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11004  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.  
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11005X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11005  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11006X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11006  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.  
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11007X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11007  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11008X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11008  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11009X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090-2  
  
 SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11009  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W  
  
 LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11010X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2092-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11010  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11011X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2092-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11011  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11012X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11012  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-11013X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	05-6KF-2091-1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11013  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11014X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11014  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
-----------	-------	-------	-------	-----

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11015X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11015  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11016X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2156-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11016  
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11017X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2156-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11017  
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11018X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11018  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11019X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11019  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11020X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11020  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE TO  
PERFORM MISSION OPERATIONS

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED  
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11021X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11021  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11022X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11022  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11023X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11023  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11024X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11024  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11025X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11025  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11026X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11026  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED OPEN MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11027X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11027  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11028X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11028  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ ]
-----------	-------	--------	-------	-----

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11029X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11029  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER FAILED HIGH CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11030X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11030  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR VERNIERS,  
THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED  
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11031X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11031  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11032X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11032  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11033X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11033  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11034X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11034  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
----------	-----	-----	-----	-----------------------

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES HE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11035X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11035  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11036X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11036  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11037X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11037  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11038X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11038  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11039X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11039  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11044X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11044  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A  
THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11045X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11045  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11046X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11046  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL  
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO  
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A  
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE  
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON  
THIS RATIONALE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11047X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11047  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11048X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11048  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11049X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11049  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11050X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11050  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11051X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11051  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11052X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11052  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11053X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11053  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11054X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11054  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11055X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11055  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11056X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11056  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11057X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11057  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11058X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11058  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11059X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11059  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11060X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11060  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH MANUALLY. LOSS OF ALL  
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11061X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11061  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11062X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11062  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL  
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO  
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A  
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE  
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON  
THIS RATIONALE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11063X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11063  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11064X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257F-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11064  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY  
CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN  
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11065X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257F-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11065  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
----------	-----	-----	-----	-----

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11066X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257G-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11066  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL  
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO  
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A  
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE  
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON  
THIS RATIONALE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11067X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257G-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11067  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11068X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11068  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11069X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11069  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11070X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11070  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE,  
CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED  
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11071X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11071  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11072X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11072  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11073X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11073  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11074X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11074  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11075X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [     ]  
NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11075  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11076X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11076  
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11077X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11077  
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11078X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11078  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	2880H[N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11079X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11079  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11080X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11080  
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11081X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11081  
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11082X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11082  
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11083X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11083  
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11084X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11084  
ITEM: HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11085X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11085  
 ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11086X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11086  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11087X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11087  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11088X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11088  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11089X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11089  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11090X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11090  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11091X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11091  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11092X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11092  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11093X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11093  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11094X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11094  
ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11095X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11095  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11096X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11096  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11097X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11097  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11098X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11098  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11099X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11099  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

]	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11100X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11100  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11101X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11101  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11102X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11102  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11103X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11103  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11104X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11104  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11105X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11105  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11106X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11106  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11107X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11107  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11108X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11108  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11109X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11109  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11110X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11110  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11111X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11111  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11112X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11112  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11113X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11113  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
----------	--------	--------	--------	--------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11114X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11114  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11115X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11115  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11116X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11116  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11117X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11117  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11118X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11118  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11119X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11119  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11120X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11120  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11121X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11121  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11122X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11122  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
----------	--------	--------	--------	--------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11123X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11123  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11124X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11124  
ITEM: RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
-----------	-------	-------	-------	-------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11125X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11125  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11126X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11126  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11127X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11127  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11128X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11128  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11129X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11129  
 ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11130X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11130  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11131X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11131  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1392

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11132X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11132  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11133X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11133  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11134X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11134  
ITEM: RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11135X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11135  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11136X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11136  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11137X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11137  
 ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11138X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11138  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11139X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11139  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTER.



